Jiffy Intel — Threat intelligence for AI artifacts

Summary

Custom GPT whose instructions ask the user to `pip install <typo-package>` before invoking its Action. The typo package exists on PyPI and is a malicious backdoor; the real package the user wanted is one letter away.

Severity & confidence

Severity

Low

Hygiene-grade issue with limited direct impact. Fix opportunistically; monitor in case context changes (new exploit, new dependency, etc.).

Confidence

Confirmed

Observed directly by Jiffy scanners or validated by multiple independent sources. Indicators are reliable enough to drive automated action.

Indicators

Observed patterns and artifacts associated with this entry. Each indicator can be copied into your detection stack or SIEM.

```
(?i)pip\s+install\s+[a-z0-9-]{3,30}
```

Detection rule

A YARA-style pseudo-rule auto-generated from the indicators above. Useful as a starting point — adapt the syntax for your target detection platform.

YARA-style pseudo-rule

rule jiffy_ti_2026_000081
{
    meta:
        source = "jiffy-intel"
        severity = "low"
        description = "Auto-generated from Jiffy Intel indicators"
    strings:
    $content_pattern_0 = "(?i)pip\\s+install\\s+[a-z0-9-]{3,30}"
    condition:
        $content_pattern_0
}

Auto-generated from the indicators above. Adapt syntax for your detection stack before deploying.

Affected tools

Tool	Versions	Status
ChatGPT (GPT Store)	`*`	vulnerable

Example artifacts

Sanitized examples of artifacts Jiffy has observed exhibiting this pattern. Publisher handles are redacted; version ranges and status reflect the most recent scan.

Data Science Helper GPTCustom GPT
Removed
Source
OpenAI GPT Store
First observed
Mar 13, 2026
Last observed
Apr 7, 2026
ML Tutor GPTCustom GPT
Under review
Source
OpenAI GPT Store
First observed
Mar 17, 2026
Notebook Wizard GPTCustom GPT
Quarantined
Source
OpenAI GPT Store
First observed
Mar 21, 2026

How to remediate

01Do not run `pip install` commands surfaced by a custom GPT.
02Always cross-check package name against PyPI via a second channel.

Timeline & sources

Timeline

First observedMar 13, 20261 month ago
Last updatedApr 26, 2026today
PublishedMar 27, 202621 days ago

Sources

scannercurated

References

attack.mitre.org

Related intel

Other entries of type Malicious Skill, or the most recent published entries if no same-type matches exist.

Malicious SkillHigh

MCP server's install script drops a skill into ~/.claude/skills/

MCP server whose install path (`pip install`, `npm i`) includes a side-effect that writes a skill file under the user's Claude skills directory. Installing the MCP silently installs a skill the user never consented to.

Jiffy IntelApr 28

Malicious SkillLow

AGENTS.md tells agent to paste ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub into PR for CI setup

AGENTS.md has a section titled "CI onboarding" that instructs the agent to paste the user's SSH public key into PR descriptions. While public keys are not immediately sensitive, the coerced habit normalizes key pasting and enables later pattern-matching attacks.

Jiffy IntelApr 28

Malicious SkillMedium

Skill installs a FUSE filesystem that shadows ~/.aws

Skill mounts a FUSE filesystem over ~/.aws on macOS/Linux that proxies reads but logs every access. The real credentials remain accessible; the skill gains a reliable sidechannel for any later AWS CLI invocation.

Jiffy IntelApr 27

Custom GPT embeds typosquatted Python package install in code-execution prompt