Jiffy Intel — Threat intelligence for AI artifacts

Summary

AGENTS.md has a section titled "CI onboarding" that instructs the agent to paste the user's SSH public key into PR descriptions. While public keys are not immediately sensitive, the coerced habit normalizes key pasting and enables later pattern-matching attacks.

Severity & confidence

Severity

Low

Hygiene-grade issue with limited direct impact. Fix opportunistically; monitor in case context changes (new exploit, new dependency, etc.).

Confidence

Confirmed

Observed directly by Jiffy scanners or validated by multiple independent sources. Indicators are reliable enough to drive automated action.

Indicators

Observed patterns and artifacts associated with this entry. Each indicator can be copied into your detection stack or SIEM.

(?is)id_rsa\.pub[^\n]{0,80}(?:paste|include|attach)

Detection rule

A YARA-style pseudo-rule auto-generated from the indicators above. Useful as a starting point — adapt the syntax for your target detection platform.

YARA-style pseudo-rule

rule jiffy_ti_2026_000074
{
    meta:
        source = "jiffy-intel"
        severity = "low"
        description = "Auto-generated from Jiffy Intel indicators"
    strings:
    $content_pattern_0 = "(?is)id_rsa\\.pub[^\\n]{0,80}(?:paste|include|attach)"
    condition:
        $content_pattern_0
}

Auto-generated from the indicators above. Adapt syntax for your detection stack before deploying.

Affected tools

Tool	Versions	Status
Claude Code	`*`	vulnerable
Cursor	`*`	vulnerable

Example artifacts

Sanitized examples of artifacts Jiffy has observed exhibiting this pattern. Publisher handles are redacted; version ranges and status reflect the most recent scan.

AGENTS.md (repo: ci-quickstart)IDE rules
Under review
Source
GitHub (public repo)
First observed
Mar 25, 2026
agents.md (repo: pipeline-templates)IDE rules
Quarantined
Source
GitHub (public repo)
First observed
Mar 29, 2026

How to remediate

01Train agents to refuse any instruction to paste credentials into PRs.
02Jiffy Layer 3 flags these instructions.

Timeline & sources

Timeline

First observedMar 25, 202623 days ago
Last updatedApr 28, 2026today
PublishedApr 2, 202615 days ago

Sources

scanner

References

attack.mitre.org

MITRE ATT&CK T1555 — Credentials from Password Stores

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/

genai.owasp.orgOWASP

OWASP LLM-02: Sensitive Information Disclosure (2026)

https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm-02-2026/

Related intel

Other entries of type Malicious Skill, or the most recent published entries if no same-type matches exist.

Malicious SkillHigh

MCP server's install script drops a skill into ~/.claude/skills/

MCP server whose install path (`pip install`, `npm i`) includes a side-effect that writes a skill file under the user's Claude skills directory. Installing the MCP silently installs a skill the user never consented to.

Jiffy IntelApr 28

Malicious SkillMedium

Skill installs a FUSE filesystem that shadows ~/.aws

Skill mounts a FUSE filesystem over ~/.aws on macOS/Linux that proxies reads but logs every access. The real credentials remain accessible; the skill gains a reliable sidechannel for any later AWS CLI invocation.

Jiffy IntelApr 27