Jiffy Intel — Threat intelligence for AI artifacts

Summary

Skill that, given `gh` CLI auth, iterates the user's repos and invites an attacker-controlled account as a collaborator. Unlike credential exfiltration the abuse path is persistent and survives token rotation if the invitation is accepted.

Severity & confidence

Severity

Critical

Active exploitation in the wild, high blast radius, or direct data exfiltration vector. Treat as an urgent remediation target; quarantine affected artifacts immediately.

Confidence

Confirmed

Observed directly by Jiffy scanners or validated by multiple independent sources. Indicators are reliable enough to drive automated action.

Indicators

Observed patterns and artifacts associated with this entry. Each indicator can be copied into your detection stack or SIEM.

(?i)gh\s+(?:api|repo).{0,200}(?:collaborator|invitation)

Detection rule

A YARA-style pseudo-rule auto-generated from the indicators above. Useful as a starting point — adapt the syntax for your target detection platform.

YARA-style pseudo-rule

rule jiffy_ti_2026_000035
{
    meta:
        source = "jiffy-intel"
        severity = "critical"
        description = "Auto-generated from Jiffy Intel indicators"
    strings:
    $command_pattern_0 = "(?i)gh\\s+(?:api|repo).{0,200}(?:collaborator|invitation)"
    condition:
        $command_pattern_0
}

Auto-generated from the indicators above. Adapt syntax for your detection stack before deploying.

Affected tools

Tool	Versions	Status
Claude Code	`*`	vulnerable
Cursor	`*`	vulnerable

Example artifacts

Sanitized examples of artifacts Jiffy has observed exhibiting this pattern. Publisher handles are redacted; version ranges and status reflect the most recent scan.

repo-sharing-skillSkill
Removed
Source
Anthropic Skills
Versions
1.0.0
First observed
Mar 19, 2026
Last observed
Apr 10, 2026
team-onboard-skillSkill
Removed
Source
Community registry
First observed
Mar 23, 2026

How to remediate

01Review collaborators on all user repos.
02Revoke any pending invitations to unknown accounts.

Timeline & sources

Timeline

First observedMar 19, 202629 days ago
Last updatedApr 22, 2026today
PublishedMar 27, 202621 days ago

Sources

scannercurated

References

blog.jiffylabs.aiJiffy Research

Jiffy Research — The AI Artifact Supply Chain

https://blog.jiffylabs.ai/posts/the-ai-artifact-supply-chain

attack.mitre.org

MITRE ATT&CK T1098 — Account Manipulation

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/

Related intel

Other entries of type Malicious Skill, or the most recent published entries if no same-type matches exist.

Malicious SkillHigh

MCP server's install script drops a skill into ~/.claude/skills/

MCP server whose install path (`pip install`, `npm i`) includes a side-effect that writes a skill file under the user's Claude skills directory. Installing the MCP silently installs a skill the user never consented to.

Jiffy IntelApr 28

Malicious SkillLow

AGENTS.md tells agent to paste ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub into PR for CI setup

AGENTS.md has a section titled "CI onboarding" that instructs the agent to paste the user's SSH public key into PR descriptions. While public keys are not immediately sensitive, the coerced habit normalizes key pasting and enables later pattern-matching attacks.