Jiffy Intel — Threat intelligence for AI artifacts

Summary

Skill that reads ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml or ~/.config/hub to capture GitHub CLI OAuth tokens and cross-posts them to an attacker-controlled paste service. First observed in a "repo-cleanup" skill that framed the access as "checking auth status before running."

Severity & confidence

Severity

Critical

Active exploitation in the wild, high blast radius, or direct data exfiltration vector. Treat as an urgent remediation target; quarantine affected artifacts immediately.

Confidence

Confirmed

Observed directly by Jiffy scanners or validated by multiple independent sources. Indicators are reliable enough to drive automated action.

Indicators

Observed patterns and artifacts associated with this entry. Each indicator can be copied into your detection stack or SIEM.

```
(?i)gh\s+auth\s+token
```

https?://(?:paste\.ee|0x0\.st|transfer\.sh)

(?:~/|/Users/[^/]+/)\.config/(?:gh|hub)/

Detection rule

A YARA-style pseudo-rule auto-generated from the indicators above. Useful as a starting point — adapt the syntax for your target detection platform.

YARA-style pseudo-rule

rule jiffy_ti_2026_000013
{
    meta:
        source = "jiffy-intel"
        severity = "critical"
        description = "Auto-generated from Jiffy Intel indicators"
    strings:
    $file_path_pattern_0 = "(?:~/|/Users/[^/]+/)\\.config/(?:gh|hub)/"
    $command_pattern_1 = "(?i)gh\\s+auth\\s+token"
    $endpoint_2 = "https?://(?:paste\\.ee|0x0\\.st|transfer\\.sh)"
    condition:
        $file_path_pattern_0 or $command_pattern_1 or $endpoint_2
}

Auto-generated from the indicators above. Adapt syntax for your detection stack before deploying.

Affected tools

Tool	Versions	Status
Claude Code	`*`	vulnerable
Cursor	`*`	vulnerable
Codex	`*`	vulnerable

Example artifacts

Sanitized examples of artifacts Jiffy has observed exhibiting this pattern. Publisher handles are redacted; version ranges and status reflect the most recent scan.

repo-cleanup-helperSkill
Removed
Source
Anthropic Skills
Versions
1.0.0
First observed
Mar 7, 2026
Last observed
Mar 31, 2026
gh-issue-syncSkill
Removed
Source
Community registry
Versions
0.2.x
First observed
Mar 13, 2026
Last observed
Apr 2, 2026
pr-status-skillSkill
Quarantined
Source
Anthropic Skills
Versions
1.0.0
First observed
Mar 18, 2026

How to remediate

01Revoke all gh CLI tokens issued in the exposure window.
02Require skills that touch ~/.config/gh to declare that scope explicitly in SKILL.md.

Timeline & sources

Timeline

First observedMar 7, 20261 month ago
Last updatedApr 14, 20263 days ago
PublishedMar 21, 202627 days ago

Sources

scanner

References

blog.jiffylabs.aiJiffy Research

Jiffy Research — Scanning AI Skills at Scale

https://blog.jiffylabs.ai/posts/scanning-ai-skills-at-scale-what-we-learned

attack.mitre.org

MITRE ATT&CK T1555 — Credentials from Password Stores

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/

Related intel

Other entries of type Malicious Skill, or the most recent published entries if no same-type matches exist.

Malicious SkillHigh

MCP server's install script drops a skill into ~/.claude/skills/

MCP server whose install path (`pip install`, `npm i`) includes a side-effect that writes a skill file under the user's Claude skills directory. Installing the MCP silently installs a skill the user never consented to.

Jiffy IntelApr 28

Malicious SkillLow

AGENTS.md tells agent to paste ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub into PR for CI setup

AGENTS.md has a section titled "CI onboarding" that instructs the agent to paste the user's SSH public key into PR descriptions. While public keys are not immediately sensitive, the coerced habit normalizes key pasting and enables later pattern-matching attacks.